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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-DISCOVERY-
MOVEMENT TOWARD FULL DISCLOSURE
Pretrial discovery is the disclosure of information about a case
prior to the commencement of the trial.1 In civil cases, on both the
federal' and state levels, the normal process of pretrial discovery
includes pretrial depositions, 3 examinations and reproduction of
documents,' physical and mental examinations of persons,5 and
the propoundment of written interrogatories by all parties.' This
process, when properly employed, virtually eliminates trial by sur-
prize.7
In criminal cases, however, almost the reverse is true; defense
counsel is frequently surprised at trial by some unknown develop-
ment. This perplexing situation is due to the common law, which
precludes all pretrial discovery in criminal cases." Thus, the seem-
ingly absurd result arises from this common law rule when parties
to a minor civil suit receive all the information they need to ade-
quately prepare for their day in court, but a defendant on trial for
murder has extremely limited access to information in the hands
of the prosecutor.9
See, e.g., Tucker v. United States 151 U.S. 164, 168 (1894).
2 The basis rules of federal criminal discovery are contained in Rules 16 and
17(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 16 allows the defendant to
inspect copy, or photograph designated books, papers, documents, and tangible
objects obtained from, or belonging to, the defendant, or obtained from others by
seizure or process, in the hands of the prosecutor, upon motion and a showing that
they are material to preparation of his defense and that the request is reasonable.
In addition Rule 17(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for
documentary evidence and objects to be subpoenaed by the parties for inspection
prior to the trial. See also Orfield, Discovery and Inspection in Federal Criminal
Procedure, 59 W. VA. L. REv. 221, 242 (1957).
1 Rules 26 and 27 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure provide for
depositions pending action, and depositions before action and pending appeal.
I Rule 34 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure provides for discovery
and production of documents and things for inspection and reproduction.
5 Rule 35 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure provides for physical
and mental examination of persons.
6 Rules 31 and 33 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure provide for
depositions of witnesses on written interrogatories and for interrogatories of parties.
Datz, Discovery in Criminal Procedure, 16 U. FLA. L. REv. 163, 175-76 (1963).
'.State v. Goldberg, 261 N.C. 181, 134 S.E.2d 334, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978
(1964); Abdell v. Commonwealth, 173 Va. 458, 2 S.E.2d 293 (1939); Shores v.
United States, 174 F.2d 838 (8th Cir. 1949).
1 Datz, supra note 7, at 164.
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Several reasons are cited to support this unfair situation.'
First, pretrial discovery is inconsistent with the adversary sytem;II
second, it leads to a greater likelihood of perjury or subornation of
perjury.'2 Third, pretrial discovery leads to intimidation of wit-
nesses, and, fourth, it is unfair for the state to be required to
disclose its case while the defendant is constitutionally protected."
The strengths and weaknesses of these arguments have been de-
bated at length,'" but most writers conclude that the situations in
criminal and civil cases are actually very similar and that since
none of the problems forecast have arisen under the Rules of Civil
Procedure, these reasons do not stand up logically and realisti-
cally."5 In the modern era, the basic question has not been whether
pretrial discovery should be allowed in criminal cases, but rather
how much should be allowed. 6 The purpose of this note is not to
debate the desirability of criminal discovery but to survey its de-
velopment and application in West Virginia.
Prior to 1965, West Virginia followed the general common law
rule and allowed no pretrial discovery.'7 Under the West Virginia
Constitution'8 and the West Virginia Code," the courts had no
," Pillans & Presnell, Florida's Proposed Rules of Criminal Discovery-A New
Chapter in Criminal Procedure, 19 U. FLA. L. REv. 68, 68-69 (1966).
" State v. Rhoads, 81 Ohio St. 397, 424, 91 N.E. 186, 192 (1910).
22 State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 210-11, 98 A.2d 881, 884 (1953).
Id. at 211-12, 98 A.2d at 885.
' See Datz, supra note 7; Fletcher, Pretrial Discovery in State Criminal Cases,
12 STAN. L. REv. 293 (1960); Goldstein, The State and the Accused; Balance of
Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1172-98 (1960); Louisell,
Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 CAI. L. REv. 56 (1961);
Louisell, The Theory of Criminal Discovery and the Practice of Criminal Law, 14
VAN. L. REv. 921 (1961).
,1 Pillans & Presnell, supra note 10, at 69.
Grady, Discovery in Criminal Cases, 19 U. ILL. L.F. 827 (1959).
,? State v. Cowan, 197 S.E.2d 641, 645 (W. Va. 1973).
I W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 21. This section provides:
[s]uch parts of the common law, and of the laws of this State as are in
force when this article goes into operation, and are not repugnant thereto,
shall be and continue the law of the State until altered or repealed by
the legislature. All civil and criminal suits and proceedings pending in
the former circuit courts of this State, shall remain and be proceeded in
before the circuit courts of the counties in which they were pending.
" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 2-1-1 (1966). This section provides:
[t]he common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to the princi-
ples of the Constitution of this State, shall continue in force within the
same, except in those respects wherein it was altered by the general
assembly of Virginia before the twentieth day of June, eighteen hundred
[Vol. 77
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discretion to allow criminal pretrial discovery. To do so would have
changed the common law, violating both the statutory and the
constitutional provisions. 0 As a result of this situation, the State
continued to retain exclusive control and access to the information
it obtained through the police and prosecutors. Many times the
defendant was overwhelmed by his own lack of investigatory re-
sources and the State's abundance of them."
In recent years a trend toward liberalizing criminal discovery
has swept the nation, and pretrial discovery has increasingly been
granted, both through statute and exercise of the courts' inherent
power to alter case law.2
In 1965 the West Virginia Legislature enacted a statute that
provides upon motion of the defendant's counsel before the trial,
the judge may compel the prosecutor to allow the inspection and
reproduction of tangible evidence within his control.2 Since the
motion was addressed entirely to the court's discretion, varying
results were observed. Some judges would grant almost all motions
for discovery, while others refused to grant any. Generally, most
judges required the defendant to show good cause before granting
the motion.Y
If the motion for discovery was denied, the defendant had no
recourse. The applicable standard for review of a judge's discre-
and sixty-three, or has been, or shall be, altered by the legislature of this
State.
Seagraves v. Legg, 147 W. Va. 331, 127 S.E.2d 605 (1962).
2, Datz, supra note 7, at 177.
2 Id.; Note, 71 W. VA. L. Rsv. 341 (1969).
2 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-1B-2 (1966). This section provides:
[u]pon motion of a defendant the court may order the prosecuting attor-
ney to permit the defendant to examine and copy or photograph any
relevant (1) written or recorded statements or confessions made by the
defendant, or copies thereof, which are known by the prosecuting attor-
ney to be within the possession, custody or control of the State, (2) results
or reports of physical or mental examinations, and of scientific tests of
experiments made in connection with the particular case, or copies
thereof, which are known by the prosecuting attorney to be within the
possession, custody or control of the State, and (3) books, papers, or
tangible objects belonging to or seized from the defendant which are
known by the prosecuting attorney to be within the possession of custody,
or control of the State.
24 This conclusion is based on interviews with the honorable Fred L. Fox, Judge
of the Criminal Court of the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit, August 25, 1974, and the
honorable Robert C. Halbritter, Judge of the Circuit Court of the Eighteenth
Judicial Circuit, July 24, 1974.
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tion, announced by the West Virginia court in Intercity Realty Co.
v. Gibson, required a showing that the judge had abused his discre-
tion.n The court quoted favorably from Brunner v. United States:
Where the law commits a determination to a trial judge,
and his discretion is exercised with judicial balance, the deci-
sion should not be overruled unless the reviewing court is ac-
tuated not by a desire to reach a different result, buy by a firm
conviction that an abuse of discretion has been committed.20
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has modified
the effect of this discovery statute. By imposing the due process
requirements of the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution on the framework of the statute, the court has limited
the scope of the trial court's discretion. In State v. Smith," the
court held that refusing the defendant's motion for inspection of a
substance alleged to be marijuana violated due process when the
exact composition of the substance was important to the defense.
The court stated, "This certainly was material evidence as to guilt
or innocence of defendant." In State v. McArdle, the Supreme
Court of Appeals disagreed with the state's position that the trial
court acted within its discretion in denying a motion to discover
the results of a scientific test made to establish the identity of a
substance alleged to be marijuana.20 The court held, first, that the
judge abused his discretion in denying a motion under the statute
because the evidence was material to guilt or punishment" and,
1 154 W.Va. 369, 377, 175 S.E.2d 452, 457 (1970). This doctrine was applied
to criminal case in State ex rel. Ghiz v. Johnson, 183 S.E.2d 703, 706 (W. Va. 1971),
in which the court evaluated the trial judge's discretion in setting the amount of
bail.
190 F.2d 167, 170 (9th Cir. 1951).
- 193 S.E.2d 550 (W. Va. 1972). In Smith the defendant was convicted of
possession of marijuana. The court held that failure to allow the defendant to
examine the alleged marijuana to determine if it was, in fact, the illegal part of the
plant, was material to guilt and preparation of the defense and thus a denial of due
process. Id. at 554.
2 Id.
- 194 S.E.2d 174, 178 (W. Va. 1973). In McArdle the defendant was convicted
of sale and possession of marijuana to an undercover officer. The primary defense
asserted at the trial was that the defendant sold only parts of the marijuant plant
and that these parts were excluded from illegality by the statute. The defendant,
however, was not given the opportunity to have his expert inspect the alleged
marijuana. The court held that this denial was a violation of due process, since the
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second, that the defendant was entitled to "a basic standard of
fairness."'"
These two cases to a grest extent established a standard of
pretrial discovery to be followed in West Virginia. A prosecutor,
pursuant to a general discovery motion prior to trial was required
to disclose any evidence that would tend to exculpate the defen-
dant or any evidence the court ordered disclosed. At this time,
however, key remained the making of the appropriate discovery
motion by defense counsel.
On July 10, 1973, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
handed down its decision in State v. Cowan,3" one of the most
liberal pretrial discovery decisions in the nation. George Cowan
was accused of committing an armed robbery in Jackson County;
while being held in the county jail awaiting trial, the defendant
wrote a letter to his alleged accomplice that contained potentially
damaging statements." A few months prior to trial, defense coun-
sel moved for pretrial discovery. The trial court granted the motion
and ordered:
" Id. at 179.
197 S.E.2d 641 (W. Va. 1973).
Id. at 644. The contents of the letter were as follows:
This is what I put in my statement. We left the laundrymat and went to
the whiskey store. Dana Monday got a pint of wine for Fredia and I went
across the street to get some cigarettes and pop. I told them the cigarettes
were for me because you are under age. OK? When I come back you were
in the front seat and Fredia was in the back where I was setting. We left
there and went to Sandyville, We stopped at a beer joint and Dana gave
me money to get beer. We then went to his trailer. I told Ken and Larry
that I took Fredia into the bedroom and screwed her. I told them that
Dana came in while we were screwing. Now this is what you have to
remember! When we come out of the bedroom Dana was trying to get you
to let him screw you. You wasn't going to let him. I told Dana to let you
alone. He said for me to shut up or he would shot me. I turn around and
started to go back to the kitchen table where I was setting and you said
(watch out George he is going to get that gun!) I grabbed a knife and
made him sit down in the chair. I told you to get his car keys. The rest
you know! OK. Just remember to say that he was going to shoot me and
everything will be alright. I'm really sorry for getting you into this mess.
I guess you are a good laugh out of that, but I really mean it. There is no
use crying about it now, but I did want you to know that rm sorry! I don't
have any cigarettes to send you, but I will get some somehow, even if I
have to rob someone over here to get them. Just hang in there for awhile.
Hey, remember you said you would write me, why didn't you. I kept
waiting to hear from you but never did. Dana Monday is supposed to be
in the hospital. He is going to have his stomach taken out.
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That defendant's counsel, within a reasonable time, be fur-
nished with a complete list of all witnesses, including their ad-
dresses, and any statements, either oral or written, made by the
defendant, intended to be used by the prosecuting attorney of
Jackson County, West Virginia, or to be subpoenaed by said
Prosecuting Attorney in any trial under the above indictment.3 '
At the trial, the State presented part of its evidence in the
morning. After the lunch hour, the prosecuting attorney obtained
the letter written by the defendant, but he presented four more
witnesses without mentioning it and rested. The defense then
called the defendant to testify. On cross-examination the prosecu-
tor had the defendant identify the letter and then read it to the
jury. Defense counsel objected and moved for a mistrial, because
the use of the letter without its prior disclosure violated the judge's
pretrial order. The motion was denied, and the defendant was
found guilty by the jury. The defendant then brought a writ of
error and supersedeas to the Supreme Court of Appeals."3
The supreme court reversed the trial court, basing its decision
on two important principles. First, from the early case of State v.
Price the court held that the defendant is entitled to a new trial
when he has been unfairly surprised or misled."8
Secondly, the court held that the defendant was denied due
process of law by the prosecutor's withholding of evidence. The
supreme court based its decision on several cases37 that set forth
the doctrine of prosecutorial suppression of evidence. 8 The West
Virginia court said that this doctrine "make[s] it constitutionally
mandatory that the prosecution advise the defense of evidence in
its possession which might be favorable or exculpatory to the de-
fendant,"3 but the court also stated that these decisions go only
31 197 S.E.2d at 643.
11 Id. at 641.
3 100 W. Va. 699, 131 S.E. 710 (1926). Price held that a new trial will be
granted to a party when he is taken by surprise on a material point or circumstance
that could not be due to his own negligence or lack of skill and that resulted in
injustice. Id. at 701, 131 S.E. at 711. The court in Cowan recognized that Price could
be distinguished but stated that "the principle announced there by this Court is
just as applicable to this case where there was such a motion and such an order."
197 S.E.2d at 647.
37 Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963); United States v. Keogh 391 F.2d 138 (2d Cir. 1968). State v. Smith 193
S.E.2d 550 (W. Va. 1971).
31 197 S.E.2d at 644.
1' Id. at 645.
[Vol. 77
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so far as to require revaluation of evidence that might exculpate
the defendant. 0 The important change Cowan introduced into
pretrial discovery is found in the statement that "[d]isclosure is
required even in the absence of discovery motions."4
The court further announced Keogh guidelines for delineating
unconstitutional suppression:
(1) Deliberate bad faith suppression for the very purpose of
obstructing the defense, or the intentional failure to disclose
evidence whose high probative value to the defense could not
have escaped the prosecutor's attention; (2) deliberate refusal
to honor a request for evidence which is material to guilt or
punishment irrespective of the good or bad faith of the prosecu-
tor in refusing the request; (3) suppression which is not deliber-
ate and where no request was made, but where hindsight dis-
closes that such evidence could have been put to significant
use. 2
These standards of unconstitutional prosecutorial suppression,
however, may not extend to all evidence that "might in some fash-
ion be useful to the defense.
' 43
Since Cowan, the standards for pretrial discovery have been
considerably loosened. First, a discovery motion is no longer a
prerequisite for getting evidence from the prosecutor, but it is still
recommended. Second, either upon or without motion, the prose-
cutor must disclose evidence that is exculpatory or material to
guilt and that meets one of the requirements set out in United
States v. Keogh.4 Third, any other evidence may be sought under
40 Id.
" Id. The court by implication overruled State v. Hamric, 151 W. Va. 1, 19,
151 S.E.2d 252, 264 (1966). In this case the prosecutor neglected to inform the
defendant of a police report that showed glass and wood particles on the murder
victim, an important aspect of the defense. The court decided that since the defen-
dant had not requested the police report, grand jury minutes, or other medical
reports, and that since in the court's opinion the results would not be changed if
they had been available, there was no reversible error committed.
,1 Id. The court patterned these standards from those in United States v.
Keogh, 391 F.2d 139, 146-47 (2d Cir. 1968).
43 Id., quoting from Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 74 (1966), in which the
Supreme Court specifically declined to consider the question of whether the uncon-
stitutional suppression doctrine covers all evidence-useful to the defense. The Su-
preme Court in Giles had found it unnecessary to decide if evidence merely helpful
to the defense was constitutionally discoverable. The West Virginia court in Cowan
recognized this limitation.
" 391 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1968). See text accompanying note 37 supra.
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the normal statutory motion process, and, fourth, if the prosecutor
refuses or neglects to comply with a discovery order, this refusal is
prejudicial error if the evidence sought is material to preparation
of a defense.45
Some aspects of the Cowan decision are unclear, however, and
may present problems. Although the court spoke only of the disclo-
sure of exculpatory evidence in its summary of the due process
requirements," it implied by acceptance of Brady v. Maryland,
that evidence reflecting on the sentencing of the defendant is also
to be disclosed.4" If this is the case, a much broader scope of discov-
ery is available, since everything material to the defendant's crime
and his past, perhaps everything in the prosecutor's file, must then
be disclosed. By the court's acceptance of Brady as the foundation
of the unconstitutional suppression rule in both McArdle" and
Cowan," the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has appar-
ently intended to accept this broader rule.
A second conceivable problem area is found in the court's
statement that "the value of the evidence . . is not for the prose-
cutor to decide, but rather is a question for the judgment of the
defense under the exercise of the proper discretion of the court."5
Although it appears on the face of this statement that defense
counsel will have great latitude in exercising his judgment con-
cerning what materials are helpful, the actual result will likely
depend on the particular judge. Since the court's exercise of discre-
tion overides any defense judgment and can only be overturned
when found to be an abuse of discretion,5' the defense counsel's
judgment can be extremely limited. On the other hand, the judge
can order the prosecutor's entire file on the case turned over to the
197 S.E.2d at 646.
" Id. at 645. The court stated here that "[tihe rules involved in these cases
make it constitutionally mandatory that the prosecution advise the defense of
evidence in its possession which might be favorable or exculpatory to the defen-
dant."
,1 197 S.E.2d at 644. In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court said, "We now
hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused
upon request violates due process where the evidence is material to guilt or to
punishment. . . ." 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
18 194 S.E.2d at 178.
1' 197 S.E.2d at 644.
5Id. at 646.
11 State ex rel Ghiz v. Johnson, 183 S.E.2d 703 (W. Va. 1971); Intercity Realty
Co. v. Gibson 154 W. Va. 369, 175 S.E.2d 452 (1970).
[Vol. 77
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defense. The court's judgment is thus substituted for that of the
defendant.
Under the Cowan rule for pretrial discovery, the prosecutor
must disclose evidence exculpatory or material to sentencing and
meeting one of the Keogh requirements: deliberate bad-faith sup-
pression to hinder the defense or intentional failure to disclose
evidence whose high probative value could not have escaped the
state's attention; deliberate refusal to honor requests for evidence
material to guilt or punishment regardless of the prosecutor's bad
faith; and nondeliberate suppression of evidence for which no re-
quest was made, but for which hindsight discloses could have been
put to significant use. This evidence must be disclosed with or
without a motion by the defense.
2
Several reasons remain for tendering a pretrial discovery mo-
tion even though it is not strictly required. First, when no motion
is made, the burden of showing materiality or helpfulness in pre-
paring the defense is higher on appeal. 3 Second, if the case may
be appealed or reviewed at a later date, the defense attorney will
be at least partially protected from a charge of inadequate repre-
sentation.-4 Third, the more information the defense attorney has
available, the better equipped he will be to make a rational evalua-
tion of his client's situation, thus speeding the plea bargaining
process and the trial. Finally, the defense attorney should take any
steps possible that lessen his chances of being surprised at trial
even by minor points that may hurt his case.
In its broadest sense, Cowan mandates a right to disclosure of
all the prosecutor's evidence; such right approaches that allowed
by the Rules of Civil Procedure. The right is limited only by the
prosecutor's privilege to his own work product55 and perhaps by the
right of the police to their reports." In its narrowest sense, however,
52 197 S.E.2d at 645.
, Id.
1 For a discussion of the inadequate counsel issue, see State v. Thomas, 203
S.E.2d 445 (W. Va. 1974).
See, e.g., McAden v. State, 155 Fla. 523, 21 So.2d 33 (1945).
In Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972), the United States Supreme Court
stated, "We know of no congitutional requirement that the prosecutor make a
complete and detailed accounting to the defense of all police investigatory work on
a case." Id. at 795. Note, however, that the procecutor in this case had turned over
his entire file to the defense, and that the majority cites no authority for their
position. In a separate opinion, Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Douglas, Stew-
art, and Powell, took the position that the police are a part of the prosecutorial team
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Cowan mandates that only the evidence material to guilt or inno-
cence be disclosed and that all other tangible evidence is subject
to discovery only upon the proper motion." In general, however, a
post-Cowan criminal trial will be less of a contest and more of an
ideal fulfilled.
Richard B. Pyles
and are, therefore, subject to the same rules as the prosecutor. Id. at 810. (Marshall,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). See also State v. Dudick, No. 13486 (W.
Va., Mar. 25, 1975).
For examples of discovery motions, see Preiser, Criminal Procedure, WEST
VMGNIA PRACTICE HANDBOOK at 6.49-6.52. Form "M" is a motion to produce and
disclose exculpatory evidence and statements, but should be updated to include
evidence etc. material to sentencing. Form "N" is a motion to furnish defendants
with a list of witnesses, and Form "0" is a motion to produce, inspect, and copy
police reports and sheriff's reports.
Note that W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-1B-3 (1966) provides that the discovery
motion be tendered not later than ten days before the trial.
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